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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
HOEVELER, Senior District Judge, 
 
William Gilchrist appeals from a final judgment of 
conviction and sentence requesting that we vacate his 
sentence and permit him to withdraw the guilty plea he 
entered pursuant to a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) binding plea 
agreement. We find that the imposition of the additional 
condition of supervised release breached the plea 
agreement, but we will remand for the district court to 
determine whether to impose the sentence of the plea 
agreement or to permit Gilchrist to withdraw his plea. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant was charged with engaging in commercial 
bribery in violation of the Travel Act and conspiring to 
violate the Travel Act. Gilchrist, who operated a trucking 
company, was charged with paying kickbacks to Donald 
Finke, the transportation manager of Welch Foods, in order 
to continue doing business with Welch. 
 
Following discussions with the government, Gilchrist 
agreed to plead guilty to a lesser charge, misprision of a 
felony, 18 U.S.C. S 4. He negotiated and executed a binding 
plea agreement with the Government pursuant to Rule 
11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
According to this agreement Mr. Gilchrist was to be 
sentenced to a nine month term of incarceration and a one 
month period of home confinement. The plea agreement 
also called for the imposition of a $10,000 fine and a $50 
 
                                2 
 
 
 
assessment. The nine month prison term was greater than 
that provided for in the Guidelines for a violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 4 (the applicable range for this offense is 0-6 
months). Appellant agreed to this upward departure from 
the Guidelines in exchange for the government's dismissal 
of its two count indictment against him. Under the 
indictment the Appellant faced a possible penalty of 10 
years incarceration and $500,000 in fines, as well as a term 
of supervised release and assessments, if he were convicted 
of both offenses. Appellant's Appendix at 17a. The parties 
further agreed that, if the district court rejected the 
stipulated sentence or imposed a more severe penalty, Mr. 
Gilchrist would be entitled to withdraw from the Plea 
Agreement and plead anew. 
 The district court accepted Mr. Gilchrist's guilty plea on 
December 11, 1996. Sentencing was scheduled for April 
pending completion of his pre-sentence investigation report. 
At the April 22, 1997 sentencing, the district court imposed 
a sentence of 9 months incarceration, a $10,000fine, a $50 
assessment and a one year period of supervised release, 
including one month home confinement. Mr. Gilchrist did 
not object to the court's sentencing at the hearing. 
 
On April 30, 1997 Mr. Gilchrist filed a motion in the 
district court to correct sentence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 
35(c). Supplemental Appendix, at 10-26. In its response the 
Government agreed that the court's sentence was not in 
line with the plea agreement and suggested that the period 
of supervised release be limited to one month. Appellant's 
Appendix at 39a. However, the district court did not rule on 
the motion within the seven day period following the 
imposition of Gilchrist's sentence, and thus no longer had 
authority to correct an excessive sentence pursuant to 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c). On May 1, 1997, Gilchrist filed a 
Notice of Appeal. He moved for expedited disposition on his 
appeal on May 14, 1997. This motion was granted and his 
sentence imposed by the district court was stayed. 
 
In his appeal Gilchrist argues that the sentence imposed 
by the district court is more severe than that stipulated to 
by the parties in the plea agreement. He further asserts 
that the district court's imposition of such a sentence 
resulted in the breach of the plea agreement. Therefore, 
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Gilchrist contends that the case should be remanded to the 
district court to afford him the opportunity to withdraw his 
guilty plea and plead anew pursuant to the remedial 
provision in the plea agreement. 
 
In response the government argues that because home 
detention may only be imposed as a special condition of 
supervised release, both parties reasonably expected the 
district court to impose a period of supervised release 
pursuant to the plea agreement which provided for one 
month home detention. Moreover, the government asserts 
that, assuming the court's imposition of supervised release 
resulted in a breach of the plea agreement, the case should 
be remanded to the district court in order to afford it the 
opportunity to correct any error and fashion an appropriate 
remedy. 
 
II. 
 
The plea agreement at issue was executed pursuant to 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(C) which authorizes the government 
and the defendant to "agree that a specific sentence is the 
appropriate disposition of the case." Such a plea agreement 
may be distinguished from one executed pursuant to 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(B) where the government makes a 
recommendation, or agrees not to oppose the defendant's 
request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding 
that such recommendation or request shall not be binding 
on the court. At the time the plea is offered the court may 
accept or reject an 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, or may defer 
its decision until there has been an opportunity to consider 
the presentence investigation report. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2). 
If the plea agreement is rejected, the court must afford the 
defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(4); U.S.S.G. S 6B1.3. If the plea 
agreement is executed pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 
11(e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the 
court does not accept the recommendation the defendant 
nevertheless has no right to withdraw his plea. 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2). Under the specific provisions of the 
plea agreement in the instant case, both parties were 
afforded an opportunity to withdraw from the agreement. 
The agreement states: 
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       If at sentencing the court fails to accept the 
       stipulations of the parties, or imposes a sentence 
       greater than that agreed to by the parties then the 
       parties have the right to withdraw from this agreement 
       and withdraw any guilty plea entered pursuant to this 
       agreement. 
 
Plea Agreement, P 5 (emphasis added). 
 
III. 
 
The first question with which this Court is faced is 
whether or not the sentence imposed by the district court 
is "greater than that agreed to by the parties." There can be 
little argument as to this point. The plea agreement clearly 
stated that the parties agreed that the appellant would be 
sentenced to a term of nine (9) months incarceration, 1 
month home detention, and a $10,000 fine. Plea agreement 
P 5. At sentencing the district court imposed a sentence of 
nine months incarceration, twelve months of supervised 
release, one month of home detention and a $10,000 fine.1 
Regardless of the intentions of the district court, the 
sentence imposed was clearly greater than that set out in 
the plea agreement. It is well settled that supervised release 
constitutes punishment. United States v. Dozier, 1997 WL 
401318 (3d Cir. (N.J.)) 8. In Dozier this Court explained: 
 
       Supervised release is punishment; it is a deprivation of 
       some portion of one's liberty imposed as a punitive 
       measure for a bad act. A defendant on supervised 
       release is subject to various terms and conditions 
       which restrict his freedom and make him vulnerable to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Presumably, the district court believed that it was carrying out the 
terms of the plea agreement when it imposed its sentence. During the 
sentencing hearing the court initially recited the sentence as it appeared 
in the plea agreement. However, at the time the sentence was imposed 
the court included the twelve month period of supervised release. That 
the court believed it was following the plea agreement is further 
evidenced by Appellant's Judgment and Commitment. While the court 
included the necessary information to ensure the imposition of one year 
of supervised release in the "supervised release" section of the document, 
under "Additional Reasons for Departure from the Guideline Range" it 
listed the sentence exactly as it appeared in the plea agreement. 
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       further punishment should he violate them. Such 
       subsequent punishment may again include more 
       imprisonment and more supervised release. 
 
Id. Thus, on its face, a sentence including a twelve month 
period of supervised release is greater than that agreed to 
by the parties. 
 
We next must determine whether or not the imposition of 
a sentence including a twelve month period of supervised 
release resulted in a breach of the plea agreement. Plea 
agreements are contractual and therefore are to be 
analyzed under contract law standards. United States v. 
Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989). "In 
determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, 
courts look to `what was reasonably understood by[the 
defendant] when he entered his plea of guilty.' " United 
States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(quoting United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 27 (3d Cir. 
1976). The government asserts that a period of home 
detention may only be imposed as a special condition of 
either supervised release or probation. See U.S.S.G. 
S 5F1.2. Therefore, the government maintains that when 
Appellant entered into a plea agreement providing for one 
month home detention, the imposition of a period of 
supervised release was, or should have been, within his 
reasonable expectations. 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that the government's 
contention that home detention may not be imposed 
without a corresponding period of supervised release or 
probation is correct, we still find that the twelve month 
period of supervised release imposed by the district court 
was not within the reasonable expectations of the 
appellant. The government asserts that U.S.S.G. S 5D1.2 
(a)(3) mandates the imposition of a one-year period of 
supervised release for a Class E felony such as misprision.2 
However, for a term of incarceration lasting less than one 
year, such as that in the instant case, the imposition of a 
term of supervised release is discretionary. U.S.S.G. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under U.S.S.G. S 5D1.2(a)(3) if a period of supervised release is 
ordered, the length of such term is one year for a defendant convicted of 
a Class E felony, such as misprision. (emphasis added). 
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S 5D1.1(b). Moreover, Rule 11 limits the discretion afforded 
the district court under the Sentencing Guidelines. An 
11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, once accepted, binds the district 
court notwithstanding departures from the applicable 
guidelines. U.S.S.G. S 6B1.2(c) (authorizing sentencing 
court to accept Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement if agreed 
sentence is within applicable guideline range or departs 
from applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons). 
 
Furthermore, the record in this case demonstrates that 
the imposition of a twelve month period of supervised 
release was neither express nor implied. The plea 
agreement itself makes no mention of supervised release. 
Similarly, the stipulated sentence presented to the district 
court at the change of plea hearing was silent as to 
supervised release. Finally, the government did not refer to 
any period of supervised release in its presentation of the 
plea agreement to the court at sentencing. Based on the 
record before this court we find that the imposition of a 
twelve month period of supervised release was beyond the 
reasonable expectations of appellant. Therefore, by 
imposing a sentence greater than that to which the parties 
agreed, the district court, although perhaps inadvertently, 
caused the plea agreement to be breached. 
 
IV. 
 
The second question we must address is whether to 
afford appellant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea 
and replead, or to remand the case to the district court to 
allow it the opportunity to fashion an appropriate remedy. 
The government is correct in noting that the well-settled 
rule in this Circuit is that where a plea agreement has been 
breached, the district court, not the defendant, is to decide 
in the first instance whether to grant specific performance 
of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea. See 
e.g., United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 
1991); United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1363 
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 184, 188 
(3d Cir. 1986); United States v. American Bag & Paper 
Corp., 609 F.2d 1066, 1068 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
In its brief the government places particular emphasis on 
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our opinion in American Bag. In that case the defendant 
corporation pleaded nolo contendere to a single-count 
indictment charging a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 1 (1976), pursuant to an 11(e)(1)(B) plea 
agreement. The agreement called for the government to 
recommend a fine of $500,000 to be paid in annual 
installments of $50,000. Id. at 1067. The contract further 
provided that "if [the court] should for any reason 
determine not to follow the government's recommendation, 
the corporation would be afforded the opportunity to 
withdraw the plea of nolo contendere." Id. at 1067. While 
both parties satisfied their obligations under the agreement, 
the district court in addition to imposing the recommended 
fine also imposed interest on the unpaid balance at 6% per 
annum. Because the plea agreement was silent on the 
matter of interest, the defendant appealed the sentence 
arguing that the imposition of interest constituted a breach 
of the plea agreement, and therefore the corporation was 
entitled to withdraw its plea. This Court remanded the 
matter to the district court for clarification regarding 
whether it had intended to reject the plea agreement or not.3 
On remand the district court refused to vacate the sentence 
and allow defendant to withdraw its guilty plea, and 
instead, vacated the interest portion of the judgment. The 
defendant's subsequent appeal to this Court claiming it was 
entitled to a withdrawal of the guilty plea despite the fact 
that the district court had vacated the interest portion of 
the sentence was denied. This Court affirmed the district 
court's election to delete the offending portion of its 
sentence and rejected defendant's claim of entitlement to 
withdrawal of the plea. 
 
Appellant correctly points out that the plea agreement in 
American Bag was executed pursuant to 11(e)(1)(B), while 
the agreement in the instant case was executed pursuant to 
11(e)(1)(C). However, upon closer examination the two 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The initial panel in American Bag remanded the case to the district 
court to consider Defendant's Motion to Correct which had been filed 
after the filing of the notice of appeal, but before the appeal had been 
heard. In its original motion, Defendant asked the court to vacate the 
interest portion of its judgment, but did not move for withdrawal of its 
plea. Upon remand American Bag argued for withdrawal of its plea. 
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agreements are very similar, and therefore the American 
Bag decision is indeed instructive. While nominally the plea 
agreement in American Bag was an 11(e)(1)(B) agreement, 
the inclusion of a provision allowing the defendant 
corporation the opportunity to withdraw its plea if the court 
did not follow the government's recommendation, in effect, 
converted the plea contract into an 11(e)(1)(C) agreement. 
 
In essence, the parties in American Bag, as they would 
pursuant to an 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, presented a 
stipulated sentence to the district court: American Bag 
would enter a plea of nolo contendere, cooperate fully with 
the government, and pay a fine of $500,000 in $50,000 
annual installments. The parties further agreed that if the 
court did not accept this "stipulated" sentence, American 
Bag would be free to withdraw its plea. Thus, the parties 
granted to defendant the same ability to withdraw a plea 
provided in Rule 11(e)(1)(C) by including a withdrawal 
provision in their plea agreement. Moreover, both the 
district court and this Court appear to have treated the plea 
agreement as if it had been executed pursuant to 
11(e)(1)(C). The district court acknowledged the withdrawal 
provision contained in the agreement when it stated: " `(If) 
the court believes that the recommended sentence is 
inadequate, the court will allow the entry of a plea of nolo 
contendere to be withdrawn on behalf of American Bag & 
Paper Corporation.' " Id. at 1067 (quoting the district court). 
Similarly, this Court observing that the record was unclear 
as to whether the district court was affirmatively rejecting 
the plea agreement, remanded the case for clarification.4 Id. 
at 1068. Had this Court ignored the plea withdrawal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is interesting to note that in the instant case Gilchrist also filed 
a 
Rule 35(c) motion seeking to correct the sentence imposed by the district 
court. Like the defendant in American Bag, Gilchrist did not move to 
withdraw his plea in his Rule 35(c) motion, but rather sought an order 
conforming his sentence to the provisions of the plea bargain. It is 
particularly worth noting that in support of his motion to correct 
Gilchrist relies on this Court's opinion in American Bag. See Defendant's 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Correct Sentence Pursuant to 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c), Supplemental Appendix, at 24. However, following the 
filing of his notice of appeal, Gilchrist moved to withdraw his Rule 35 
motion. 
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provision and read the agreement in American Bag as a 
traditional 11(e)(1)(B) plea agreement, it would have been 
under no obligation to remand the case to the district 
court. It could have instead interpreted the district court's 
imposition of interest as an authorized modification of the 
sentence recommended by the government in the plea 
agreement. 
 
As noted above the record in the instant case suggests 
that it is unclear whether the district court intended to 
reject the terms of the plea agreement as proposed by the 
parties. In American Bag we concluded that: 
 
       [w]hen, as here, the court does not intend to reject the 
       terms of a plea bargain but, nevertheless, imposes a 
       sentence allegedly inconsistent with the terms of that 
       plea bargain, it appears consistent with the provisions 
       of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(4), to allow the district court, in 
       the first instance, the opportunity to correct its own 
       error. Thus the district court, upon appropriate motion, 
       may choose to conform the sentence to the terms of the 
       plea bargain or allow withdrawal of the plea. 
 
In spite of the fact that the plea agreement in the instant 
case was executed pursuant to 11(e)(1)(C) as opposed to 
11(e)(1)(B), for the reasons stated above, we still find the 
reasoning in American Bag applicable.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Appellant relies on the Sixth Circuit's opinion in United States v. 
Mandell, 905 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1990). In that case the defendant 
entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement specifying a precise 
range and a stipulation including an agreed upon offense level. Mandell's 
plea agreement, like that in the instant case, included a provision 
authorizing the defendant to withdraw his plea if the sentencing court 
departed from the stipulations of the parties. Mandell, 905 F.2d at 971. 
The sentencing court accepted the plea, but upon review of the 
presentence report, increased the offense level. The Sixth Circuit held 
that the plea agreement had been breached. The court noted that 
generally a breached plea agreement was remedied by either specific 
performance or by allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea. The 
Mandell court concluded that the agreement itself provided for the 
remedy of withdrawal of the plea, and therefore under the circumstances 
the option of specific performance entitled the defendant to the same 
remedy as withdrawal. Id. The court further determined that the 
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V. 
 
Upon consideration of the record, we will vacate the 
judgment and sentence of the district court. The matter 
shall be remanded to the district court to determine 
whether the appropriate remedy is to require specific 
performance of the agreement or permit the appellant to 
withdraw his plea. Unless the court can, and is disposed to, 
impose the sentence agreed to by the parties in accordance 
with applicable statutes and guidelines, appellant should 
be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea and plead 
anew. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
agreement did not provide Mandell with the right to have his sentence 
determined at the stipulated offense level under a theory of specific 
performance. Consistent with our opinion in American Bag, we leave the 
initial determination of whether Gilchrist is entitled to specific 
performance of his plea agreement, and thus the sentence to which he 
stipulated, to the district court. 
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring dubitante. 
 
I join in the majority opinion insofar as it vacates the 
judgment of the district court, but I have problems with its 
instructions on remand. The majority orders that the 
matter 
 
       be remanded to the district court to determine whether 
       the appropriate remedy is to require specific 
       performance of the agreement or permit the appellant 
       to withdraw his plea. Unless the court can, and is 
       disposed to, impose the sentence agreed to by the 
       parties in accordance with applicable statutes and 
       guidelines, appellant should be afforded the 
       opportunity to withdraw his plea and plead anew. 
 
In my view, this discussion does not give the district court 
adequate guidance as to what might constitute a proper 
sentence within the framework of the plea bargain. 
 
The majority has properly concluded that the sentence of 
twelve months supervised release violated the plea  
agreement.1 Perhaps the majority has in mind that the 
district court on remand might reduce the term of 
supervised release to one month conditional on one month 
home confinement. While that would be a legal sentence, I 
think that it would breach the plea bargain. 
 The majority's analysis, however, suggests that such a 
sentence could be imposed on remand. It reasons that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court's decision to include a twelve month term of 
supervised release in Gilchrist's sentence is not the non-sequitur that it 
appears to be at first glance. Although under U.S.S.G. S 5D1.1(b) the 
imposition of a term of supervised release is discretionary where the 
term of incarceration is less than one year, under U.S.S.G. S 5D1.2(a)(3) 
if a period of supervised release is ordered, the length of such term is 
one year for a defendant convicted of a Class E felony. When this is 
coupled with the fact that home detention may only be imposed as a 
condition of probation or supervised release, see U.S.S.G. S 5F1.2, it 
appears entirely possible that the District Court felt that it was 
required 
to impose a one year term of supervised release in order to effectuate the 
plea agreement. In fact, it was not so required since under U.S.S.G. 
S 6B1.2, the court may accept an 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement if it departs 
from the guideline range "for justifiable reasons." 
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       Plea agreements are contractual and therefore are to be 
       analyzed under contract law standards. United States 
       v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989). 
       "In determining whether a plea agreement has been 
       broken, courts look to `what was reasonably 
       understood by [the defendant] when he entered his 
       plea of guilty.' " United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 
       1164 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Crusco, 
       536 F.2d 21, 27 (3d Cir. 1976)). The government 
       asserts that a period of home detention may only be 
       imposed as a special condition of either supervised 
       release or probation. See U.S.S.G. S 5F1.2. Therefore, 
       the government maintains that when Appellant entered 
       into a plea agreement providing for one month home 
       detention, the imposition of a period of supervised 
       release was, or should have been, within his reasonable 
       expectations. 
 
I am unsure that the underlined statement is correct. I 
have substantial reservations about importing into a plea 
bargain a kind of punishment that the parties did not 
appear to contemplate.2 Here neither the government nor 
the defense apparently considered the possibility of 
supervised release. Perhaps they thought that home 
detention could be free-standing. At all events, they did not 
mention supervised release in the plea agreement. 
 
Perhaps the parties reasonably should have expected that 
home confinement carried with it supervised release. While 
contract standards may generally apply, I believe that 
courts must be more circumspect in divining the 
reasonable expectations of a defendant who enters into a 
plea agreement than we might be in the case of a contract 
that does not implicate an individual's liberty interest. 
Indeed, if courts construed plea agreements narrowly, as I 
think they should, the message would be clear that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As the majority correctly points out, it is well settled that 
supervised 
release constitutes punishment. See Maj op. at 5. For a list of the 
recommended conditions of supervised release, which can convert 
otherwise legal activities like wandering into an unsavory bar, talking 
with felons or other disreputable characters, or drinking too much into 
grounds for re-incarceration, see U.S.S.G. S 5B1.4. 
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"expectations" such as the one at issue in this case must 
appear in the text of the agreement. 
 
I would also be troubled if the majority has in mind that 
the district court might sentence Gilchrist to one month 
home confinement without supervised release. While the 
majority declines to reach this question, I believe that such 
a sentence would be illegal. Under U.S.S.G. S 5F1.2 home 
detention "may be imposed as a condition of probation or 
supervised release". I read this as clearly indicating that 
home detention is not a free-standing sentence and thus 
that the District Court is without authority to impose it on 
Gilchrist as such.3 
 
Notwithstanding these comments, I am not sufficiently 
sure that the majority is wrong that I style this opinion a 
dissent, which would require me to vote to remand with 
directions to vacate the plea of guilty and permit the 
defendant to go to trial.4 I therefore concur dubitante. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If, of course, the district court were simply to impose the nine month 
prison term and the fine and assessment but with no supervised release 
and no home confinement, there would be no problem. And, obviously, 
there would be no problem if the court permits Gilchrist to withdraw his 
plea. 
 4. It seems clear that Gilchrist believes that the government no longer 
can prove a case against him at trial. I presume that a key witness has 
"gone south" on the government.                                 
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